Contents
- SHIMIZU, T.
TAKAHASHI, N.
Note
on complete proof of Axelrod's Theorem pp. 39-46 (388KB)
This note will give a complete proof of Axelrod's theorem
that characterizes the advantage of Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy in the repeated
prisoner's dilemma. Despite of its importance in Axelrod's study, the proof
of the theorem is incomplete. First, the fault of the proof is depicted
and two approaches for complementation are shown. Then, we provide the complete
proof using these two approaches.
Keyword: repeated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-For-Tat, cooperation
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